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I. Introduction.
The solution of controversies is one of the services offered by the State to its commu-
nity. In principle, this service is, generally, an exclusive one (at least in some of the areas it
serves, such as criminal law or divorces), and its basic nature allows for no other server in
the market. Most often in the area of financial, economic or commercial disputes, legal
and judicial systems have not been as jealous in keeping an absolute monopoly over con-
flict resolution. In any case, the principle of state exclusivity in conflict resolution holds
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valid only as far as the judicial system is socially efficient; otherwise, society itself provides
its own alternative solutions. However, as we shall see, alternative ways of solving disputes
work well in some situations, but not in others. The purpose of this article is to explore
what is happening in this respect in the area of financial disputes.
The relationship between law and the judicial system on the one hand, and the eco-
nomic and financial community on the other, has recently become clearer. For a good
while it was thought in many parts of the world that legal and judicial systems were the
outcome of the economic order that determined them. Positivist jurists saw the two of
them as unrelated, at least for serious scientific legal purposes. What economists have
been telling us during the last decade is that the economy of a country is the result of
what the legal and judicial systems allow it to be. Apart from a rich bounty of legal litera-
ture, two recent Nobel Prizes in Economics (North and Coase) sustain just that.' An inef-
ficient judicial system reduces the opportunities of access and increases the costs of trans-
action. Preliminary studies by the World Bank staff and other economists tentatively
quantify the economic impact of a judicial system at around fifteen to twenty percent of
the growth rate of a country.2
II. A View of the Landscape.
From the windows of the offices of a corporate international lawyer, a comparative
legal scholar, or an officer of an international financial institution, it is possible to see a
panorama in which the great bulk of financial disputes is still adjudicated by the national
courts of different countries rather than by arbitration or other non-judicial means.
Along with torts, these disputes are the great bulk of the civil cases handled by those
courts. Among others, in Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland,
Austria, Australia, Germany, Singapore, and Hong Kong, the perception by both national
and foreign users is that the courts are doing either an "excellent" or a "very good" job.3
But the easy flow of efficient facilitation of international finance in a global society
requires more; it requires that the social efficiency of both the legal and the judicial sys-
tems is a reality-not only in certain parts of the globe but, at the very least, in a substan-
tial part of it. A close examination shows that this is far from being the case.
In Peru, for instance, businesspeople consider that it is not worthwhile for them to go
to court to collect debts below five or ten thousand U.S. dollars, depending on the size of
the firms involved. In inflationary economies, like Venezuela or Ecuador in the seventies or
1. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); LEE J. ALSTON ET AL.,
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1996); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). See also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
(1988); RICHARD A. ESPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); WILLIAM M. LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (4th ed. 1986).
2. Robert M. Sherwood et al., Judicial Systems and Economic Performance, 34 Q. REv. ECON. & FIN.
101 (1994).
3. World Competitiveness Report (1993/94).
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eighties, creditors had only collected minimal amounts of their loans after two or three
years in court. In Egypt, the battle to obtain payment on a debt is barely begun with the
receipt of the "final" judgment in court. In Indonesia, the reduced percentage of debts that
can be effectively collected after a judgment is rather small. In Poland, the debt collection
process is so long, costly, and cumbersome that the government has had to exonerate banks
from the need to resort to a judge to collect privileged debts, the payment of which they can
demand directly from the debtor through the sheriff of the court, in order to prevent the
collapse of its banking system. In Russia, a number of bank insolvencies during the early
nineties created chaos in the courts with long lines of complainants waiting all night for
several weeks to present their complaints. In Albania, the collapse of the pyramid system in
some financial institutions created havoc that required intervention from abroad to calm
the riots that followed. And even worse, in some cases, mobsters and gangsters moved into
the scene and began to act as court enforcers.4 In all such cases, businesspeople and the gen-
eral population look for alternatives-not merely for auxiliaries or complements, but for
true alternatives. But can arbitration really be a valid alternative?
Not all the changes have been only for the worst, of course. All of those mentioned
and many other similar events have created a need to look for valid alternatives, and
although most of the formulas found were more related to trade than to finance, some
examples exist. For example, the debt crisis of the seventies and eighties in Latin America
caused the reversal of a long and solid tradition that had reached in many countries the
rank of a constitutional principle-the Calvo Clause. The use of the "clause" had prevent-
ed States from resorting not only to domestic or international arbitration, but also to
judicial action in any other jurisdictions. According to the Calvo Clause, any dispute that
arose from a contract between a state and a foreign party had to be submitted to local law
and local jurisdiction, thus excluding the option of national or international arbitration.
Changes also have occurred in the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which previously had
created a barrier for creditors to sue sovereign debtors. Under that doctrine, the creditors
were frequently unable to resort to arbitration in those matters. Additionally, the ratifica-
tion by a large number of States of the New York Convention and the Panama
Convention has made the international recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
much easier. These events encouraged other developments, such as the World Bank spon-
soring the creation of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) as a forum for investment disputes. One economist notes that, after a late start in
the financial services industry, arbitration now seems to be gaining momentum quickly.5
"A few years ago a number of prominent financial institutions committed to resolve their
internal disputes by binding arbitration. Then financial institutions tentatively began to
take customer disputes to arbitration. '6
4. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Russian Bankers Demand Legislation to Protect them from
Assassination Attempts (British Broadcasting Corporation, Aug. 4, 1995), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. Between 1993 and 1995, the Russian Mafia was suspected of 83
assassination attempts and 45 assassinations of bankers in Russia. The Russian Mafia has, in
fact, settled down somewhat because in order to "operate" they demand of the person "hiring"
them the production of a valid and conclusive judgment.
5. See JAMES R. BUTLER, JR., ARBITRATION IN BANKING (1988).
6. Id. at 24.
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III. A Sobering Reflection.
Even though businesspeople are resorting more often to arbitration, not all types of
financial disputes are equally suitable to this type of quasi-judicial solution. We should
still recognize-without prejudice-that courts are still the best alternative in some cases,
while private justice is better in other cases. Arbitration implies, in principle, that all par-
ties to a suit-at some given moment-agreed to arbitrate, and that there are no reluctant
litigants. When this is not the case, it might be necessary to resort to preventive coercive
measures that arbitration cannot generally provide.
Financial disputes exemplify how important it is to carefully consider all the conse-
quences of the decision to arbitrate. With respect to financial disputes, there is probably
nothing more pressing and important, as far as volume of the number of cases is con-
cerned, than debt collection-and most likely, nothing is as ill-suited to the classical and
traditional forms of arbitration. In addition, small claims arbitration can result in almost
unaffordable expenses that make litigation uneconomical outside of court. On the other
hand, in a claim by a large number of depositors against their bank, the psychological ele-
ments involved in mass behavior do not create a climate in which arbitration can be most
effective. Alternatively, differences on technical financial matters like currency exchange,
particular types of interest, negative pledge, devaluations or swaps are outside of the gen-
eral training and experience of the average judge in developing nations; there lawyers are
better trained in constitutional, civil, criminal or procedural matters instead of financial,
monetary or economic problems. To avoid this paradox, some syndicated lenders will
include a contractual clause forcing borrowers to submit to the jurisdiction of the lender
banks. If of different jurisdiction, the borrowers submit to that of the agent or lender,
which is very often New York or London, where judges are better qualified in these areas.
In this arena, the advantages for resorting to arbitration are more evident. The Permanent
Court of International Arbitration at The Hague has also modified its statutes in order to
hear cases in which one of the parties is not a state, opening a new acceptable forum for
sovereign debtors. But in many countries, a long list of approvals and authorizations are
still required for governments to become part of arbitration procedures, which often
defeats the purpose of arbitrations.
IV. The Necessary Context for Arbitration.
The social efficiency of international non-judicial means of solving disputes depends on
more than just writing a good law. Of course, a good law provides adequate tools and a
frame within which a controversy can unfold. A good law is necessary but, alone, it is not suf-
ficient because arbitration requires other external elements in order to fulfill its true role in
society. Countries as diverse as Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, Guatemala, and Peru have reason-
ably good arbitration laws and institutions; yet "reasonably good" is a far cry from "success-
ful:' While it may be true that a good arbitration can take place in those countries, arbitra-
tion is not socially, politically, or economically significant there. Thus, arbitration cannot ful-
fill its important and transcendental role for the citizens of those countries. What happens is
that people simply do not resort to arbitration as a practical solution in significant numbers;
arbitration is still elitist. Most people are still unaware that parties in arbitration enjoy more
confidentiality, that parties in arbitration can expect greater expertise from arbitrators than
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from judges or juries, and that arbitration is faster, less expensive, less formal, and more final
than a judicial proceeding.7 This gap in knowledge results in a lack of community response
to the problem. Compound this with a stereotype of arbitration, especially those sponsored
by business associations, as biased against the customers, and arbitration awards tend to be
smaller than those granted by courts.8 As a result, arbitration is not seen as a viable alterna-
tive to judicial proceedings.
Nevertheless, the need to look for alternatives remains. In many countries the general
public distrusts the judicial system as a way to satisfy their legal claims. But in most of
these countries, there is more a culture of authority than a culture of service. 9
Instinctively, when people look for an alternative, they look for an option with authority
and power, in the political or physical sense of the words, instead of the moral or social
one that would be the natural choice in a culture of service and freedom.
This need for authority affects the judicial process. In Guatemala, many peasants,
instead of resorting to the local judges feel more confident if they present their claims to
the Mayor of the town, or even to the head or the duty officer of the local regiment. In
Albania, the elders of the towns in the mountains exercise a natural and effective authori-
ty in their communities. But that is of little consequence as far as financial operations are
concerned. As a result, they lack a valid alternative, and, faced with a financial crisis that
the courts of justice were not able to handle, the outcome was an eruption of violence. In
Peru, Indonesia, Egypt, and the Philippines, large sectors of the population trust neither
the official system nor the alternatives offered by other institutions; thus, informal alter-
natives must be found. 10 One possible alternative is, of course, compulsory arbitration by
law. This can take place by forcing parties to submit to arbitration or conciliation before
going to court, so that actually going to court would be the last resort when all other
avenues are exhausted. This "necessary step:' however, could, if applied well, be converted
into a mere formality rather than an alternative to an official proceeding. This happened
earlier this century in Latin America when new procedural codes were enacted that called
for a conciliatory hearing at the beginning of the procedure. A legal culture of lawyers
and judges converted it, in a few years, into one more step to a procedure already too
long."l A fairly designed compulsory arbitration system has a great deal to offer to
employees in many countries. Many employees, especially lower-income workers, are shut
out of the current litigation process because their low salaries make receiving large dam-
7. See generally DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL 1-42 (LEXIS Law
Publishing 3d ed. 1998); BUTLER, supra note 5, at 21, 33.
8. See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 15
(1997).
9. See Roberto G. MacLean, The Culture of Service in the Administration of Justice, 6 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Spring 1996).
10. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (June
Abbot trans., 1989).
11. Another way of implementing compulsory arbitration is that used in labor cases in the United
States. Compulsory arbitration provisions can be created as stand-alone agreements, or insert-
ed as part of broader written employment agreements. They can be broad enough to encom-
pass virtually every employment dispute imaginable, or drawn narrowly to encompass only a
limited range of disputes (such as those involving discharge from employment). See BALES,
supra note 8, at 3.
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age awards unlikely. This in turn makes it difficult to attract attorneys who will handle
these cases on a contingency basis.
1 2
Another method of encouraging arbitration institutions is to replace the image of
authority in a culture. Official institutions that sponsor arbitration include the
Permanent Court of International Arbitration, ICSID, the World Bank, the World Trade
Organization (WTO), or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Additionally, private well-established institutions like the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) and the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission, or even
local chambers of commerce like the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, among several
others, enjoy a well-deserved international reputation.13
There are also other national, more specialized types of institutions in the United
States that sponsor arbitration in more circumscribed fields, such as the National
Association of Securities Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration. Other institutions deal with arbitration not in one particular
country or in a particular field like commerce, securities or investments, but in general,
and their authority and reputation covers all type of cases, like the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), the Center for Public Resources (CPR), the Institute for Dispute
Resolution, the London Court of International Arbitration, and the Hong Kong
International Arbitration Center. Arbitration can also be sponsored by individual corpo-
rations or entities that carry on businesses with large numbers of persons, like banks,
insurance companies, or transport companies, which can include in their contracts an
arbitration clause. Finally, judges, lawyers (especially at the time of drafting contracts),
and scholars can play an important part in developing arbitration as a valid alternative.
V. Why Is Arbitration of Growing Importance?
It has been said repeatedly that arbitration is growing in importance because it offers
parties more confidentiality and expertise, less expense and formality, and on top of it all,
it saves time. This list presents only a partial view, a view that although correct, neglects
other important elements that should also be considered.
A. THE COST OF ARBITRATION.
We have just mentioned that among the widely recognized advantages of arbitration
is that it is less expensive for the parties. Even though that assertion is not always neces-
sarily true, and even though there are cases in which the contrary is the truth, the real
economic advantage of arbitration for society is that it shifts the economic cost of litiga-
tion from the taxpayer to the user of the service.
Normally, financial litigation is part of the cost of the financial business, along with
risk assessment, credit information and collecting agencies. The inefficiency of the judi-
cial system can increase for the general public the cost of transactions and reduce the
12. See id. at 9.
13. It is important to be aware, however, that in spite of its name, the "Arbitrazh" system in the
Russian Federation is not an arbitration system but a commercial court system for corpora-
tions and other legal persons.
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opportunities of access. However, the efficiency of the system does not benefit equally the
general public and the user, as would be the case with criminal justice or family cases and
some labor litigation. Therefore, it makes sense that the users of the system should absorb
a major part of the expense of solving their disputes and the taxpayers a minor part. We
have seen that financial disputes are, with torts, the majority of civil cases handled by the
courts. Some countries, such as Russia and Egypt, charge large percentages of the
amounts in dispute as court fees for plaintiffs. There is in the United States at least one
state, Tennessee, that collects from the users in judicial fees and fines a sum larger than
the judicial budget of that state. But arbitration also, if developed properly, can. take part
of the financial burden from the taxpayer. The economic cost of arbitration to the rest of
society is nothing, compared to amounts that range from 0.9 percent to six percent from
national or state budgets for the overall cost of judicial systems. This is why financial dis-
putes tip the balance in favor of the privatization of justice.
B. THE ADMINISTRATION OF ARBITRATION.
From the administrative side, the advantages of arbitration for societies are many
sided. To begin with, the problem of the adequate selection of judges and all its political,
administrative, cultural, and financial implications is eliminated; the selection of judges is
based on the trust parties feel for them, as it has been since the very beginning. When
Moses wandered for forty years in the desert, people spontaneously took all their conflicts
to him. Moses spent days solving disputes, as it is described in the book of Exodus, from
very early in the morning till very late at night. 14 Based on this trust, in arbitrations, the
burden of selection is removed from society, and each party selects its own arbitrator.
Another advantage-except in special cases, like WTO or NAFTA, ICSID or perhaps
ICC-is that arbitration does not require as complicated an organization as judicial sys-
tems do, not such large archives, not as complicated dockets, not such large numbers of
support staff, not large requirements of infrastructure and technology. The administrative
expenses of arbitrations, except in very special cases, is not comparable to courts, and the
public does not pay them. But the most important advantage in administration is that it
reduces not only bureaucracies, but also inefficiency and with it the main cause of cor-
ruption in judicial systems. The transparency that arbitration offers to the parties in a dis-
pute makes cases of corruption very exceptional indeed.
C. THE NATURE OF THE PROCEDURES.
Arbitration helps address many of the problems of international litigation in a court
of justice that have to do with procedural matters. First, the malady of "Forum Shopping"
is eliminated if the jurisdiction is established by mutual agreement, as is usually the case
in arbitration. Second, the problem of assignment of cases to a particular judge, the
source of many irregularities, is also eliminated. Third, arbitrators are more "service con-
scious" toward the parties than judges are, simply because the jurisdiction of arbitrators is
not compulsory like that of judges and is only the result of the agreement of the parties.
As Judge Roger Warren, President of the National Center for State Courts in the United
States said once, he would like to instill in every judge the idea that there is a court a hun-
14. Book of Exodus, ch. 18, verse 13.
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dred yards away offering exactly the same service that the judge offers. The "motto" of
arbitrators could well be in this respect: "We never forget that you have a choice." Fourth,
submission and assessment of evidence does not take as long in arbitrations as in courts
of law. Fifth, arbitrators can be much less formalistic than judges in the procedure, with
the result that in many cases it is easier to reach a settlement in arbitration than in a court
of law, especially in countries without discovery. Sixth, as decisions of arbitrators are not
binding on future cases, there is more flexibility for arbitrators than for judges if circum-
stances change, especially in common-law countries.
D. THE TRAINING FOR ARBITRATORS.
At present, there are numerous institutions around the world dedicated to training
judges and their support staff at the expense of the taxpayer, with differing levels of suc-
cess, while the training of arbitrators, when it takes place, is at the expense of the arbitra-
tor or sponsoring institutions. (The type of skills needed by arbitrators is also important,
but will be dealt with below.)
E. PARTICIPATION OF THE COMMUNITY.
One of the features of conflict resolution systems in developed industrial countries is
the involvement of the community in the solution process. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Abe
Fortas said years ago that judicial systems have neither their own economic sources nor
their own armed forces, and that their true authority resides in the backing they receive
from the community and public opinion. Their true force, he said, is their power of persua-
sion and of moving public opinion. As a result of shortcomings in their decision and law
making processes, developing countries suffer a fracture between their legislative bodies,
their judiciaries, and the community.15 The flow of currents of public opinion between
them is not fluid, and, as a result, the public perception of them is rather poor. In an evalua-
tion made by the World Competitiveness Report 1993-1994, the large numbers of conflict
resolution systems of developing countries were evaluated by users below a mark of five
over a maximum of ten. As Luis Pasara notes, in a Gallup survey in Argentina, forty-nine
percent of those interviewed thought that the system was either "bad" or "very bad:' forty
percent thought it was "medium:' and eighty percent did not find any positive aspect in it at
all. In Peru, in a survey made under the auspices of the United Nations Development
Program, three out of four crime victims thought that the system was corrupt. 16 The gener-
al perception in Jakarta, Indonesia is that "justice" belongs to the highest bidder, and the
system in Russia is evaluated on the ten-point scale. Coincidentally, in all of these countries,
participation by the community is almost non-existent.
The difference with arbitration is that it cannot exist without participation; it is
based on voluntary participation. So the growing importance of arbitration in interna-
tional finance-and its shortcomings-have to be measured mainly by the participation
of the community. The efficiency, success, planning, training, and development of arbi-
tration must be measured in the same way. However, this is an aspect in which arbitration
could be more successful with a much larger capacity to grow. For all of its impressive
15. See Roberto G. MacLean, The Social Efficiency of Laws as an Element of Political and Economic
Development, 4 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 6 (Spring 1998).
16. See Luis PASARA, JUECES Y JUSTICIA EN TELA DE JUICIO (1995).
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achievements, arbitration remains elitist to a certain degree, with the exception of infor-
mal arbitration, which grows and develops without connection and relation to the estab-
lished ways and institutions mentioned here. There is a whole new field to cultivate, and
there is the need to be more aggressive in developing new markets.
F. IMPACT OF ARBITRATION ON SOCIETY.
Many questions arise: What is the role of arbitration in society? What is the impor-
tance of arbitration beyond the individual cases? Why should everybody be concerned
that arbitration works and works well? First, at the most elementary level, arbitration is
an important relief from the gigantic pressures of backlogs of cases in the great majority
of courts all over the world. At a meeting of the Law Asia Conference in Manila in 1997,
one of the vice-presidents of the People's Supreme Court in China reported that China
has around 360 million cases pending in the courts. In India, the number of cases pend-
ing is estimated at around forty-five million. And in other countries, even though with
not such impressive numbers in the whole system, the backlog is concentrated in some
particular courts, which damages the performance of the overall system. So, the first role
for arbitration in society is to act as an auxiliary to judicial systems to help them to deal
with heavy loads of cases.
Arbitration can also act as a complement to the judiciary, to fill in for the recognized
limitations and shortcomings of jurisdictional organizations and judicial training in the
majority of countries in the world today. The training of judges and even of lawyers is
deficient and is becoming increasingly formalistic and inadequate to address the needs of
society. The requirements of international trade, investment and finance are not satisfied
in a very large number of countries around the world. Matters like maritime cases, insur-
ance, finance, futures, and securities have become so sophisticated and specialized that
someone who is not familiarized with the trade cannot easily cope with them. So arbitra-
tion, with its rich and almost unlimited resources, can provide answers and solutions in
almost any conceivable field.
The third and most important role and impact of arbitration in society is as a neme-
sis of judicial systems. The emergence of arbitration in the field of conflict resolution
responds to the shortcomings of judges, and highlights the fact that things are being done
incorrectly in judicial systems. It is similar to how courts of equity developed during the
Middle Ages in England, except that in this case, the response did not come from another
office of the kingdom, but, as befits more liberal and democratic times, from ordinary cit-
izens, merchants, bankers, professionals, etc. Thus, arbitrators and arbitration institutions
rise from being mere auxiliaries of justice to become specialized complementaries and
then finally to become the conscience of judicial systems-the guardians of justice, equi-
ty, freedom, exchange, development, distribution of wealth, and of understanding-in
areas in which the general public might not otherwise perceive whether courts of justice
are acting appropriately or not. In the early Middle Ages, knights errant were the mirrors
of rulers and judges. In the Golden Century of Spain in "Don Quixote de la Mancha" the
earthly and common Sancho Panza became the mirror, for centuries to come, of how
judges, mediators, conciliators, or arbitrators should look at their business. Now is the
time for arbitrators to perform that function. This is the deepest impact that arbitrators
can have and their most important civic and political duty.
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VI. The Social Responsibility of Arbitrators.
In contrast to judges, arbitrators do not always need to be lawyers. Sometimes, even in
international conflicts, a panel is entirely formed by non-lawyers, because, above anything
else, arbitration is about solving disputes; laws are only one of the tools to solve disputes.
When King Solomon the Great was faced with a dispute between two prostitutes, each of
whom claimed the maternity of the same child, he did not resort to the latest statute on the
subject, the precedents set by several centuries of judges in Israel, or the many authorities
that had written and interpreted mosaic law. Mocking formal justice, he ordered the child
cut in two and ordered one-half to be given to each of the alleged mothers. When one of
them resigned her right in order to save the child, he discovered the real mother. Granted,
halving a child is not quite the same as halving forty million dollars, yens, marks, francs, or
rupees. The point is, however, that even apparent purely legal disputes are, in fact, not about
laws, but about value that balances political, economic, social, cultural, ethical or religious
interests in conflict. If arbitrators do not understand the values that are at play in a conflict
and do not have the intuitive lucidity to establish a balanced order, they will not be a true
alternative. Rather, like the medieval ordeal, they will only be a transient incident, a foot-
note, and a temporary detour in the history of conflict resolution.
Especially in the world of finance, laws and regulations reflect the reality of interna-
tional relations from very much the perspective of capital exporting countries. These are
truly international laws, and they work well within certain sectors of society and in cer-
tain areas of the world. But even these international laws are not prepared yet for a truly
balanced, global society. In finance, there is no equivalent to The Hague Rules, Hague-
Visby Rules, or Hamburg Rules for maritime trade, or the several international conven-
tions for the Sale of Goods, or rules for international air transport. In all these fields, the
actors are moving ahead towards a global community. Some international financial regu-
lations have moved forward; the rules for wire transfers are a change. But in lending, we
are a long distance from where we need to be. One of the lessons that the debt crisis of the
eighties should have taught us is the inadequacy of the existing rules to meet the needs of
a plural and global society. 17 Who can find the way? Judges? Judges are not, unfortunate-
ly, prepared for the future in much of the world. This is the challenge for arbitrators, and
enhances the growing importance of arbitration in international finance.
VII. Conclusion.
The inadequacy of existing rules and the overwhelming growth of financial develop-
ments around the world create a unique opportunity for leadership and creativity. The
leaders who grasp that opportunity will help to shape a new society and to establish a new
international order based on the awareness that today's problems in Bolivia, Uzbekistan,
Burundi and Tonga may be knocking at our doors tomorrow morning. The limitations of
judicial systems and the shortcomings of judges around the world present this extraordi-
nary opportunity to arbitrators, not only as learned jurists and deep thinkers, but also as
bold leaders, intelligent dreamers and peace lovers.
17. See Roberto G. MacLean, Legal Aspect of the External Debt, 2 RECUEIL DES COURs 35 (1989).
